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Abstract
The goal of the paper is to describe the role and structure of non-
foundational reasoning, i.e. a kind of argumentation that meets the 
revisability, the feedback, the background stability and the disput-
ability conditions. I begin by observing that any nonfoundational 
reasoning has two components: the deductive and the hermeneu-
tic. Next, against the background of Gadamer’s insightful, although 
somewhat vague, observations I attempt to uncover aspects of the 
hermeneutic component. I then proceed to reconstruct nonfounda-
tional argumentation with the help of formal theory of belief revi-
sion, defeasible logic, and logical conception of coherence. Finally, 
1 The paper is based on my previous work: B. Brożek, Philosophy 
and Neuroscience: Three Modes of Interaction, [in:] J. Stelmach, 
B. Brożek, Ł. Kurek (eds.), Philosophy in Neuroscience, Copernicus 
Center Press, Kraków 2013; and B. Brożek, A. Olszewski, Logika 
zapętleń, [in:] B. Brożek, J. Mączka, W. Grygiel, M. Hohol (eds.), 
Oblicza racjonalności, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2011. This 
paper was written within the research grant “The Limits of Scientific 

























I argue that nonfoundational reasoning is the backbone of both 
scientific endeavours and philosophical inquiry.
Keywords
nonfoundational reasoning, foundationalism, hermeneutics, belief 
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1. What is nonfoundationalism?
The search for the foundations of knowledge has always been the Holy Grail of philosophers. Descartes famously begins 
Meditations with the following passage:
Several years have now elapsed since I first became aware that 
I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, 
and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles 
was highly doubtful; and from that time I was convinced of the 
necessity of undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the 
opinions I had adopted, and of commencing anew the work of 
building from the foundation, if I desired to establish a firm and 
abiding superstructure in the sciences.2
He proceeds by employing his method of methodical doubt, 
and arrives at ego cogito ego sum as the only certain proposi-







I  •  2014
tion, one that may serve as the point of departure to reconstruct 
– albeit not deductively – the entire body of human knowledge.
The history of philosophy teaches us, however, that 
Descartes’ grand project was destined to fail; that there is no 
such thing as the foundations of knowledge; that the belief in 
such foundations often leads to dogmatism, which is one of the 
great enemies in our pursuit of truth; and that our attempts to 
acquire knowledge are always imperfect and fallible. Perhaps 
the most famous metaphors which serve to underline these facts 
would be Neurath’s image of the sailors rebuilding a ship on the 
open sea, and Quine’s view of knowledge as a web of beliefs. 
Neurath says:
There is no way to establish fully secured, neat protocol state-
ments as starting points of the sciences. There is no tabula rasa. 
We are like sailors who have to rebuild their ship on the open 
sea, without ever being able to dismantle it in dry-dock and re-
construct it from its best components.(…) Imprecise ‘verbal clu-
sters’ are somehow always part of the ship. If imprecision is di-
minished at one place, it may well re-appear at another place to 
a stronger degree.3
Quine echoes Neurath when he argues in “Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism” that our knowledge resembles a web, and any change 


























in one of its nodes may require changes in others; even logic and 
mathematics are just nodes in the web of knowledge, and hence 
they are not immune to revisions. Moreover, if this is the case, 
“our statements about the external world face the tribunal of 
sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body.”4
The rejection of foundationalism leads to the following 
questions: what does nonfoundational reasoning look like? Can 
it be reconstructed logically? What are the criteria employed 
when one reasons nonfoundationally? In order to answer these 
questions, let us consider the following passage from Michael 
Heller’s essay “Against Foundationalism”, in which he observes 
that each philosophical argument has two components: the de-
ductive and the hermeneutic:
I believe that all arguments in philosophy, but also in the scien-
ces, can be arranged in a sequence, such that at its – say – left end 
there are arguments without the hermeneutic component, while at 
the right – arguments without the deductive component. (…) Ra-
tionalistic arguments are relatively closer to the left-hand side of 
the sequence; visionary arguments are relatively close to the right-
hand side. Crucially, any philosophical argument, which pertains 
to a non-trivial philosophical claim, is never devoid of the her-
meneutic component.5
4 W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1980, p. 41.
5 M. Heller, Przeciw fundacjonizmowi, [in:] M. Heller, Filozofia 






I  •  2014
He also adds that:
in a typical situation there exists a kind of feedback between the 
vision and the logical argumentation. Even if the chain of argu-
ments is inspired by a vision, rational argumentation may influ-
ence it, giving rise to its revisions and, in a critical situation – 
even to its rejection.6
Such a view of philosophical argumentation leads firmly to 
the rejection of foundationalism: if argumentation is a constant 
interplay of the hermeneutic vision and deduction, there exist no 
indefeasible, ‘clear and distinct’ premises, or there exists no un-
shakable foundation for our philosophical constructions. Argu-
mentation in philosophy takes on a different form:
When one begins to solve a problem, (...), one accepts certain hy-
potheses (...). It is important to note that these are hypotheses, not 
certainties (...), and maybe even working hypotheses. By using 
them one arrives at a solution of a problem (…). The results of the 
analysis may either strengthen one’s initial hypotheses, or lead to 
their modifications. Such a procedure may be repeated multiple 
times, resulting in the self-adjustment of the system.7
6 Ibidem, p. 94.
7 M. Heller, Nauki przyrodnicze a filozofia przyrody, [in:] M. Heller, 

























Heller’s insightful remarks may be summarized – and given 
more precise form – in the following way. Any philosophical ar-
gumentation must meet four conditions:
(a) the revisability condition: at least some of the premises 
of any philosophical argumentation are hypotheses – 
these can be rejected or modified;
(b) the feedback condition: the modification or rejection of 
premises (hypotheses) must be based on the evaluation 
of their logical consequences;
(c) the background stability condition: the argumentation 
background (some previously accepted theories other 
than the evaluated hypotheses) is relatively stable in re-
lation to the hypotheses; it should be easier to modify or 
reject the hypotheses than the background;
(d) the disputability condition: any philosophical argumen-
tation is open to formulating competing, even contra-
dictory, hypotheses.
Heller rightly observes that arguments that meet the above 
stated conditions cannot be accounted for within classical logic. 
He urges us therefore to look for a ‘non-linear logic’, or such a logic 
that would encapsulate the structure of nonfoundational thinking.8 
8 The classical relation of logical consequence is a non-linear func-
tion. In addition, there exist formal systems called nonlinear logics. 
However, Heller speaks of something different – a logic of epistemo-
logical non-foundationalism – and hence I used the term ‘non-linear 
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Although I cannot offer such a full-blooded logic here, I would 
like to suggest that non-foundational arguments can be expli-
cated with the use of some non-classical but still well-known 
formal tools and, in particular, the formal theory of belief revi-
sion and the formal theory of coherence. However, I would like 
to begin the analysis by considering the ‘hermeneutic compo-
nent of reasoning’ referred to by Heller.
2. The hermeneutic component
In order to understand the hermeneutic dimension of argumen-
tation, it is necessary to consider the philosophy of Hans Georg 
Gadamer, or so I argue. Although Gadamer speaks of under-
standing and interpretation, and not of arguing, his conclusions 
are applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the characterization of any 
kind of reasoning. Gadamer and his followers claimed that the 
process of understanding cannot be accounted for with the use 
of standard logical tools; he went even further by claiming that 
understanding has little to do with logic. However, he speaks of 
the structure of understanding, and wherever there is a structure 
it must be – at least in principle – formally reconstructable: if not 
in classical logic, then with the use of nonstandard formal tech-
niques. Moreover, I believe that some of the observations of the 
proponents of hermeneutics are indeed insightful, but it is diffi-
cult to appreciate and analyze them as they are usually expres-

























a high level of ‘Gads’ (Gadamer’s students referred to less clear 
fragments of his works with this phrase).9
I posit that is it relatively easy to present a satisfactory – 
although not the only possible – formalization of the herme-
neutic process of understanding, though it requires a non-dog-
matic approach to the Gadamerian conceptual scheme. Gadamer 
claims that within the process of understanding “the constitution 
of sense or meaning (Sinn)” takes place.10 The problem is, what 
does ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’ stand for here, since Gadamer speaks 
of their ‘consistency’ or ‘coherence’, and ‘consistency of sense 
(meaning)’ sounds awkward.
This problem may be dealt with when one follows an in-
sightful directive formulated by Karl Popper, who insists on dis-
tinguishing subjective, personal and psychological activities and 
processes, from the
(more or less successful) outcomes of these activities, from their re-
sult: the ‘final state’ (for the time being) of understanding, the inter-
pretation. (…) [When a subjective] state of understanding [is] finally 
reached, so a psychological process which leads up to it must be 
analysed in terms of the third-world objects [i.e., abstract objects] in 
which it is anchored. In fact, it can be analysed only in these terms.11
  9 J. Grondin, Hans-Georg Gadamer. Biografia, Wydawnictwo Uni-
wersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2007, p. 291.
10 H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, Continuum, London 2004, 
p. 164.
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Popper suggests that – instead of speaking of ‘capturing the 
meaning’ or other subjective processes connected with inter-
pretation or understanding – one should rather analyze the out-
comes of those processes. Thus, in what follows, I will read what 
Gadamer says about ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’ as if he were speaking 
of ‘propositions’ or ‘sentences’.
The two key hermeneutic concepts that describe the structure 
of understanding are: pre-understanding or pre-judgment (Vorver-
standnis, Vorurteil) and the hermeneutic circle. It is possible, or so 
I argue, to capture those concepts in a precise way with the use of 
some formal tools. Of course, it is only a paraphrase of the origi-
nal conception, but arguably an admissible one.
Gadamer nowhere defined the concept of pre-understand-
ing and he speaks of pre-judgments as a transcendental con-
dition of understanding. He criticizes the Enlightenment tradi-
tion, claiming that by rejecting pre-judgments as not based on 
the authority of reason, the only admissible authority, it itself 
embraces a prejudice. One cannot however, Gadamer contin-
ues, imagine understanding without a pre-understanding. Gad-
amerian pre-understanding has at least two dimensions. Firstly, 
everyone who engages in the interpretation (understanding) of 
a text is a participant in a certain culture (tradition), and so un-
derstanding and interpretation are always relative to a tradition. 
Secondly, pre-understanding also has an individual ‘flavor’: one 
that interprets or ‘poses a question to a text’, always anticipates 
an answer, initially ascribes some meaning to the text.12 

























These theses are far from clear and dangerously close to non-
sense. What does it mean that one ‘poses a question to a text’? 
What is ‘the anticipation of meaning’? In what way – apart from 
the obvious, that context influences interpretation – does tradition 
play the role of a ‘transcendental condition of understanding’? It 
is tempting to conclude that, while Gadamer may be trying to ver-
balize something important, the result is vague and imprecise and 
brings rather more confusion than insight.
However, I believe that it is possible to express the intui-
tions that stand behind Gadamer’s obscure phrase in a more pre-
cise way. To do so, I suggest distinguishing between four kinds 
of pre-understanding. First, the thesis that ‘tradition’ is a tran-
scendental condition of understanding may be seen as an attempt 
to say that whoever interprets something must use an interpreted 
language. Thus, she must have at her disposal a vocabulary, syn-
tactic rules (rules for constructing compound expressions), rules 
of inference and a function which maps constants to individu-
als belonging to the domain of language, one-place predicates to 
sets of such individuals, etc. Second, participation in the same 
tradition requires a shared set of presuppositions. Usually, it is 
assumed that a sentence A is a presupposition of a sentence B iff 
B may be ascribed truth or falsehood only if A is true. Third, two 
persons participate in the same tradition if they have the same or 
similar background knowledge, where the term usually refers to 
all those statements that – within the process of solving a prob-
lem – are assumed to be true or unproblematic. Here, I shall un-
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of all those sentences that – at least prima facie – are taken to be 
true or justified. Fourth, it seems that the best way to explicate 
the individual dimension of pre-understanding is to treat pre-
judgements as initial hypotheses, i.e. sentences capturing the 
sense (meaning) of the interpreted text, which one formulates at 
the beginning of the process of interpretation, and aims at con-
firming or rejecting them in due course.
Given the above, if one is to interpret a text then one is in 
the following position: she has at her disposal an interpreted lan-
guage (L), a set of presuppositions (P), background knowledge 
(K) and a set of initial hypotheses (H). How does the process of 
interpretation look like? Gadamer describes it by recourse to the 
concept of a hermeneutic circle. He says, for instance:
But the process of construal is itself already governed by an ex-
pectation of meaning that follows from the context of what has 
gone before. It is of course necessary for this expectation to be 
adjusted if the text calls for it. This means, then, that the expecta-
tion changes and that the text unifies its meaning around another 
expectation. Thus the movement of understanding is constantly 
from the whole to the part and back to the whole. Our task is to 
expand the unity of the understood meaning centrifugally. The 
harmony of all the details with the whole is the criterion of cor-
rect understanding. The failure to achieve this harmony means 
that understanding has failed.13

























And elsewhere he adds:
every revision of the foreprojection is capable of projecting be-
fore itself a new projection of meaning; rival projects can emerge 
side by side until it becomes clearer what the unity of meaning 
is; interpretation begins with fore-conceptions that are replaced 
by more suitable ones. This constant process of new projection 
constitutes the movement of understanding and interpretation.14 
According to my interpretation, Gadamer simply suggests 
that the structure of interpretation has a non-foundational char-
acter. In opposition to the ‘linear’ character of the classical logic, 
where from given premises one draws logically valid conclu-
sions, non-foundational reasoning, although it begins with some 
premises, does not treat them as non-revisable.
3. The structure of nonfoundational argumentation
Given Heller’s characterization of nonfoundational thinking, as 
well as Gadamer’s insights regarding the hermeneutic dimen-
sion of understanding, we are now in a position to describe the 
structure of nonfoundational argumentation. The idea is simple: 
with a given language L and the background knowledge K one 
puts forward certain hypotheses H1, H2, H3, …, each aiming at 
solving a problem at hand. We shall say – simplifying conside-
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rably – that a problem is defined by a pair of contradictory sen-
tences {p, ~p}, and that to solve a problem means to determine 
which of the sentences, p or ~p, is true. Thus, a hypothesis H 
solves a problem when it (together with some other previously 
accepted sentences) implies p or ~p. Importantly, any newly in-
troduced hypothesis H together with the background knowledge 
K may yield contradiction. In such cases, one needs to revise or 
reject some parts of the background knowledge, and this proce-
dure is well modeled in formal theories of belief revision.15 In 
other words, the set K*H1, i.e., K revised by H1, may not inc-
lude every sentence, which was originally in K (I simplify here, 
disregarding the fact that there usually are many ways of revi-
sing K by H1, and so the set K*H1 is in fact chosen from among 
the possible ways of modifying K in order to accommodate H1). 
To put it succinctly: revisions such as K*H1, K*H2, K*H3 often 
result in the modifications to the background knowledge.
Whether such modifications are acceptable depends on 
whether an introduced hypothesis (H1, H2, H3) indeed solves 
a problem that has previously remained unsolved. However, this 
is not the only criterion for assessing the quality of a hypoth-
esis. The other such criterion is coherence: we shall say that 
the better the hypothesis (solving some problem) is, the more 
coherence it generates in our system of beliefs. Coherence is 
15 Cf. P. Gardenfors, H. Rott, Belief Revision, [in:] D.M. Gabbay, 
Ch. Hogger, J.A. Robinson (eds.), Handbook of Logic in Artificial In-
telligence and Logic Programming, vol. IV: Epistemic and Temporal 

























determined by taking into account: (a) the number of nontriv-
ial inferential connections in our belief set (so in K*H1, K*H2, 
K*H3 respectively); and (b) the degree of its unification.16 There 
exist nontrivial inferential connections between sentences be-
longing to a given set if they can serve together as premises in 
logically valid schemes of inference. In turn, a given set of sen-
tences is unified if it cannot be divided into two subsets without 
a substantial loss of information.
Thus, the question is which from among the considered hy-
potheses H1, H2, and H3 (all of which solve the problem at 
hand), should be given priority? The answer lies in the interplay 
between two factors: the extent of modifications a hypothesis 
causes within our background knowledge (the fewer changes 
the better), and the degree of coherence it brings about in our 
belief set (the higher degree the better). There is no simple for-
mula to settle this interplay, it is rather a matter of decision on 
a case by case basis. However, it is reasonable to assume that if 
two hypotheses, H1 and H2, bring about a similar level of coher-
ence, and when H1 causes substantial modifications in the back-
ground knowledge, while H2 changes it only slightly, it is H2 
that should be preferred. Similarly, when both hypotheses pro-
duce similar modifications in the background knowledge, but 
one of them brings about more coherence, it should be preferred. 
It must also be added that there may be situations in which all 
16 Cf. L. Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Harvard 
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of the considered hypotheses cause such substantial changes to 
the background knowledge that they cannot be accepted, even if 
they solve the problem at hand and bring about much coherence.
As I have already stressed, the situation depicted above, i.e. 
one which takes into account only the background knowledge 
and the hypotheses, is a simplification. However, it may easily 
be extended to give a more fine-grained description of nonfoun-
dational argumentation. For instance, one can utilize the concept 
of presuppositions, which enables to capture two important as-
pects of non-foundational thinking. Firstly, one can speak of the 
presuppositions P of the background knowledge K; in particular, 
the set P may contain the so-called existential and lexical pre-
suppositions. Existential presuppositions posit the existence of 
a certain entity or a state of affairs (e.g., when I say that “John 
has a new car” it presupposes that John exists); lexical presup-
positions, on the other hand, are sentences which must be true 
in order for some concepts to be applicable (the lexical presup-
positions of the sentence “John is not a bachelor” include “John 
is a male”). The introduction of the set of presuppositions P en-
ables one to describe a situation in which a hypothesis leads to 
the modification not only of some fragment of our background 
knowledge, but also of our existential commitments and our 
conceptual scheme (when it causes the rejection of an existen-
tial or a lexical presupposition, respectively). 
Secondly, the utilization of the concept of a presupposition 
enables one to account for a situation in which one determines 

























in the way we understand the process of solving problems. We 
shall say that a hypothesis H solves a given problem defined by 
the set {p, ~p} if H (possibly together with some other sentences 
belonging to the background knowledge) deductively implies 
p or ~p, or it deductively implies ~s, where s is a presupposition 
of p. In the latter case – where s, a presupposition of p, turns out 
false – one can say that the solution to the problem defined by 
the pair {p, ~p} is that the problem is ill-stated, i.e. neither p nor 
~p can be ascribed truth-values.
The introduction of presuppositions into our formal account 
of nonfoundational argumentation requires two additional com-
ments. The first is that while our background knowledge should 
be more stable (i.e., more immune to revisions) than our hypoth-
eses, our presuppositions should be more stable than our back-
ground knowledge. Thus, when one chooses from among a num-
ber of hypotheses of which all solve the problem at hand and 
bring about much coherence into one’s belief set, the hypothe-
sis should be preferred which causes fewer modifications within 
one’s system of presuppositions. Still, it must be stressed that 
taking advantage of the mechanism of presuppositions requires 
changes in the logic underlying nonfoundational reasoning.17
The above described procedure meets all the conditions of 
nonfoundational argumentation that I identified at the beginn-
ing of this essay. Firstly, neither the hypotheses one considers, 
17 Cf. B. van Frassen, Presupposition, implication and self-reference, 
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nor one’s background knowledge, are immune to revisions, and 
so the revision condition is fulfilled. Secondly, the quality of 
hypotheses hangs together with the changes they bring about 
in our belief system, and they are modified or rejected if the 
changes are unacceptable (so, the feedback condition is met). 
Thirdly, the background stability condition is fulfilled since al-
though background knowledge is not immune to revisions, from 
among the hypotheses that solve the problem and bring about 
a similar level of coherence the one should be preferred that 
saves most of the original background knowledge. Moreover, in 
cases when all the hypotheses cause substantial modifications of 
the background knowledge, they may all be rejected. Fourthly, 
as the above described formal framework enables one to work 
simultaneously with several hypotheses, the disputability condi-
tion is met (it must be stressed, however, that this requires a spe-
cial underlying logic, e.g., the so-called defeasible logic).
4. Nonfoundational reasoning 
in philosophy and science
Numerous philosophical conceptions which have been defended 
throughout history were foundational or isolationist. They in-
clude not only Descartes’ grand project, described at the begin-
ning of this essay, but also the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, vari-
ous post-Kantian philosophies in the 20th century (e.g., Husserl’s 

























For example: the defenders of the contemporary versions of 
Thomism underscore the autonomy of philosophical thinking:
The autonomy of Thomism boils down to the fact that its point of de-
parture, as well as justification criteria, are independent of the truth of 
revelation as well as the findings of the natural sciences. The results of 
those disciplines can only (and often do) constitute the source of inspi-
ration for new philosophical questions and determine new issues for 
metaphysical reflection. The maximalism (of Thomism) is connected 
to the fact that the goal of philosophizing is to uncover the fist and ulti-
mate causes of the entire reality, including the cause of all causes – the 
Absolute, which makes the world intelligible and frees philosophical 
explanation from absurdity.18
Thus, the representatives of Thomism repeatedly stress that 
the autonomy of philosophy hangs together with its specific ob-
ject and method: while the sciences consider only the so-called 
proximate causes of things, philosophy is capable of uncover-
ing the ultimate causes of reality. Because of that, no empirical 
finding can falsify – or serve as a means for the rejection of – 
a philo sophical theory. One should rather speak of two separate 
planes of reflection, philosophical and scientific, and if there is 
any relationship between them, it is the philosophical method 
that represents a higher, more profound mode of cognition. 
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This is an example of foundationalism in philosophy. 
Thomists believe that there exists only one true view of reality, 
captured by the Aristotelian-Thomistic conceptual scheme and 
penetrable by the Aristotelian-Thomistic method. All the three 
dimensions of this foundationalism – ontological, conceptual 
and methodological – prevent the findings of the sciences from 
having any bearing on philosophical discourse: the sciences in-
vestigate only the manifestations of substances, utilize a method 
which cannot account for beings qua beings, and hence take ad-
vantage of a conceptual scheme which is not translatable into the 
metaphysical conceptual scheme and is inferior to it. The prob-
lem is that this kind of foundationalism in philosophy leads to 
daring consequences, when the relationship between philosophy 
and science is considered. As Michael Heller puts it:
Today, after 300 years of the dynamic development [of the natural 
sciences], the employment of the strategy [of isolation] leads to two 
different kinds of danger. Firstly, some deep questions of obvious 
philosophical character (Did life originate from inanimate matter 
with no external factor at play? Is human brain only a perfect cal-
culator?) may be rejected as no genuine philosophical issues (as 
they cannot be formulated within a given philosophical system). 
Secondly, artificial and highly confusing problems arise when one 
tries to speak of nature using a language which is inadequate for 
this purpose (i.e., a language of a certain philosophical system).19

























What Heller stresses here is that the faith in a philosophical 
system – in unshakable ontological or conceptual foundations 
– may easily lead to dispensing with real problems and devot-
ing time and effort to pseudo-problems. A closed, isolated philo-
sophical system, one that provides answers to any questions, but 
only such that can be formulated within its conceptual frame-
work, generates neither truth nor understanding, and hence be-
comes a caricature of what philosophical reflection should be.
This ‘negative argument’ against foundationalism in philos-
ophy, underscoring the fatal consequences of adopting unshak-
able ontological foundations and caging oneself in a conceptual 
scheme fixed for eternity, is only one of a number of ways to 
defend nonfoundationalism in philosophical thinking. Another 
would be to stress human fallibility and indicate that the ra-
tional strategy in dealing with any problem should be to consider 
several possible solutions at once, and to treat those solutions 
as only temporary hypotheses than firm premises. This, boldly 
speaking, is the basis of Karl Popper’s epistemology.
I believe that nonfoundationalism is also characteristic of 
argumentation in the sciences, which is clearly visible when one 
considers the accounts of scientific discovery provided by such 
philosophers as Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn or Feyerabend (there 
are, of course, differences between their stances, but the basic 
structure of scientific argumentation they all describe is arguably 
a nonfoundational one). Let us have a look at one particular ex-
ample, beginning with an idealization: although it is commonly 
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free observations and experiments, and that our theories play 
important heuristic and interpretation roles in our observational 
and experimental activities, let us assume that there are ‘pure’ 
scientific facts (results of observations and outcomes of exper-
iments). What does a scientific explanation of such facts con-
sist in? I posit that there are three different criteria at work here: 
empirical adequacy, convergence and coherence. An empirically 
adequate theory must connect facts in such a way that it may 
serve as a means of prediction (even if not an infallible one). 
For instance, neuroscientists claim that the human mathematical 
cognition is partly based on the workings of the so-called Ob-
ject Tracking System (OTS). It is a system that enables the track-
ing of multiple individuals (up to 3 or 4), and based on the prin-
ciples of cohesion (moving objects are recognized as bounded 
wholes), continuity (objects move on unobstructed paths) and 
contact (objects do not interact at a distance).20 The existence 
of the OTS system is confirmed by a number of tests, including 
visual short-term memory tasks, multiple-objects tracking tasks, 
or enumeration tasks. The last kind of tests confirms the human 
ability of subitizing, i.e. of an instant and highly accurate deter-
mination of a number of object in small collections (3-4), even 
presented very briefly.21 Further, it is speculated that the poste-
rior parietal and occipital regions of the brain play a crucial role 
20 M. Piazza, Neurocognitive Start-Up Tools for Symbolic Number 
Representations, [in:] S. Dehaene, E. Brannon (eds.), Space, Time and 
Number in the Brain, Academic Press, London 2011, p. 270.

























in the performance of such tasks, which suggests that these re-
gions are the location of OTS.22 Now, as the current theories 
posit that OTS is capable of discriminating up to 4 objects, they 
would be empirically inadequate if it turned out that infants are 
capable of tracking 10 or 15 object at once. 
Still, there may exist various competing theories explaining 
the same set of facts. For instance, there is a controversy regard-
ing how children move from using the numbers 1-4 (an ability 
which is likely based on the OTS mechanism), which seems to 
be an innate skill, to mastering arithmetic. One proposal was put 
forward by Piazza.23 She observes that the Approximate Num-
ber System (ANS) – a mechanism for representing the approx-
imate number of items in sets – may be used to represent not 
only large numbers, but also small ones. ANS works according 
to the famous Weber’s Law: the threshold of discrimination be-
tween two stimuli increases linearly with stimulus intensity. In 
the case of ANS, Weber’s fraction, or the smallest variation to 
a quantity that can be readily perceived, changes over human 
development. For newborns it is 1:3, for 6-month-old babies it 
is 1:2, for 1-year-old children it is 2:3, for 4-year-olds it is 3:4, 
for 7-year-olds it is 4:5, while for 20-year-olds it is 7:8. It means 
that a newborn can discriminate between 1 and 3, or 2 and 6, or 
10 and 30, but not 1 and 2, 2 and 5, or 10 and 27. Four-year-old 
children can tell that there is a difference in numerosity between 
22 Ibidem, p. 270.
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sets consisting of 6 and 8 or 12 and 16 elements, but not 7 and 
8 or 12 and 15. An adults’ ANS system is even more ‘sensitive’: 
they can discriminate (without counting) between sets consist-
ing of 14 and 16 elements or 70 and 80 elements, but not 70 and 
78 elements.24 Now, Piazza observes that ANS rather quickly 
becomes very precise as regards small numerosities. Given the 
progression in the sensitivity of ANS, in order to distinguish be-
tween 2, 3, and larger numbers a ratio of 3:4 is needed. This hap-
pens at around three years of age, and coincides with the period 
when children become ‘three-knowers’. In other words, Piazza 
believes that no interplay between OTS and ANS is needed to 
‘break the number four barrier’ – the increasing precision of the 
ANS system is sufficient to account for this ability. 
Another hypothesis which addresses this problem is de-
fended by Spelke. She observes that “children appear to over-
come the limits of the core number system when they be-
gin to use number words in natural language expressions and 
counting.”25 Children learn the first ten counting words by the 
age of 2, but initially use them without the intended meaning. At 
three they know that ‘one’ means one; at four they associate ‘2’, 
‘3’ and ‘4’ with the corresponding numerosities. Then, there is a 
kind of ‘jump’ – children learn the next numbers quite quickly. 
This, according to Spelke, requires two things: (a) to understand 
24 Ibidem, p. 268–269.
25 E.S. Spelke, Natural Number and Natural Geometry, [in:] S. De-
haene, E. Brannon (eds.), Space, Time and Number in the Brain, Aca-

























that every word in the counting list designates a set of individ-
uals with a unique cardinal value; and (b) to grasp the idea that 
each cardinal value can be constructed through progressive ad-
dition of 1.26 How is this possible? “For most children, the lan-
guage of number words and verbal counting appears to provide 
the critical system of symbols for combining the two core sys-
tems (i.e., ANS and OTS), and some evidence suggests that lan-
guage may be necessary for this construction.”27
Thus, we have two competing explanations of the same set 
of facts: that human innate skills cannot account for simple arith-
metic, and that something in individual development must facili-
tate – or even enable – ‘breaking the number 4 barrier’. Piazza be-
lieves that the increasing sensitivity of ANS is sufficient to explain 
how it happens, while Spelke claims that it is the development of 
language skills that plays the pivotal role here. How should one 
decide which of those is acceptable? One of the possibilities is to 
use to the criterion of convergence. Let us state some additional 
facts. First, both children and adults in remote cultures, whose 
languages have no words for numbers, when dealing with num-
bers larger than three recognize their equivalence only approxi-
mately. Second, deaf persons living in numerate cultures but not 
exposed to deaf community use a gestural system called home-
sign; they use fingers to communicate numbers, but only with ap-
proximate accuracy. Third, educated adults who suffer language 
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impairments have problems with exact, but not approximate nu-
merical reasoning. Fourth, when doing exact (but not approxi-
mate!) tasks, adults spend more time with numbers that are diffi-
cult to pronounce, even if they are presented in Arabic notation. 
Fifth, bilingual adults who are taught some new mathematical 
facts in one of their languages have difficulties in the smooth pro-
duction of exact number facts in the other language.28 All of these 
facts support Spelke’s hypothesis – but not Piazza’s – because it 
is Spelke’s claim that language is essential to acquiring arithme-
tic skills which is empirically adequate for a larger set of facts. In 
other words, Spelke’s hypothesis converges on more experiment al 
and observational data than Piazza’s. 
Another criterion that may be used to pick from among 
competing – and empirically adequate – hypotheses is coher-
ence. Spelke’s claim that language is essential in the develop-
ment of arithmetic skills seems highly coherent with Lakoff’s 
theory of embodied mind, while Piazza’s hypothesis is not. This 
may be seen as an argument from coherence in favor of Spel-
ke’s hypothesis. At the same time, there may be other theories – 
e.g., some incarnations of the modular mind paradigm – which 
would favor Piazza’s stance. The point is that the criterion of co-
herence constitutes an important justification standard in neuro-
scientific discourse. 
Thus, even in the idealized picture of neuroscientific prac-
tice we have assumed, one that posits the existence of pure, 

























theory-free facts, there are competing explanations of the same 
sets of facts, and the criteria for choosing from among them in-
clude convergence and coherence. Of course, the situation be-
comes even more complicated when we drop our idealizing as-
sumption and admit that our theories – and, in particular, some 
of our entire paradigms, such as embodiment or modular para-
digm – provide both heuristic and interpretation frameworks for 
neuroscientific practice. But the conclusion remains the same: 
neuroscientific thinking, at its core, is non-foundational. Neuro-
scientific hypotheses – as well as background knowledge – are 
revisable, and the revisions are caused not only by empirical in-
adequacy of our theories, but also by the consequences we draw 
from our new hypotheses. The background knowledge in neuro-
science is usually quite stable (as illustrated by the persistence of 
entire paradigms, such as the embodied or modular one). Finally, 
neuroscientific argumentation fulfills the disputability condition: 
one usually formulates and chooses from among a number of hy-
potheses explaining the given phenomenon.
* * *
In this essay I have tried to illustrate two things: that argumenta-
tion in philosophy and science is nonfoundational, and that non-
foundational reasoning – one that meets the revisability, feed-
back, background stability and disputability conditions – may 
be accounted for logically. Of course, there may exist other in-
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which are perhaps better than the one presented here. In partic-
ular, the present proposal is quite heterogeneous, as it glues to-
gether several different formal mechanisms (belief revision, the 
theory of logical coherence, and defeasible logic). It is possible 
that a more coherent formal framework could do the same job. 
I leave this problem for further research.
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